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An active area of research in the fields of machine learning and statistics is the development of
causal discovery algorithms, the purpose of which is to infer the causal relations that hold among a
set of variables from the correlations that these exhibit. We apply some of these algorithms to the
correlations that arise for entangled quantum systems. We show that they cannot distinguish corre-
lations that satisfy Bell inequalities from correlations that violate Bell inequalities, and consequently
that they cannot do justice to the challenges of explaining certain quantum correlations causally.
Nonetheless, by adapting the conceptual tools of causal inference, we can show that any attempt
to provide a causal explanation of nonsignalling correlations that violate a Bell inequality must
contradict a core principle of these algorithms, namely, that an observed statistical independence
between variables should not be explained by fine-tuning of the causal parameters. In particular,
we demonstrate the need for such fine-tuning for most of the causal mechanisms that have been
proposed to underlie Bell correlations, including superluminal causal influences, superdeterminism
(that is, a denial of freedom of choice of settings), and retrocausal influences which do not introduce
causal cycles.
I. INTRODUCTION
A causal relation, unlike a correlation, is an asymmetric relation that can support inferences about the consequences
of interventions and about counterfactuals. The sun rising and the rooster crowing are strongly correlated, but to say
that the first is the cause of the second is to say more. In particular, it says that forcing the rooster to crow early will
not precipitate an early dawn, whereas causing the sun to rise early (for instance, by moving the rooster eastward),
can lead to some early crowing. Nonetheless, causal structure has implications for the observed correlations and
consequently one can make inferences about the causal structure based on the observed correlations. Indeed, there
has been much progress in the last twenty-five years on how to make such inferences, progress that has been primarily
due to philosophers and researchers in the field of machine learning and which is well summarized in the books of
Pearl [1] and of Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (SGS) [2]. Such inference schemes are known as causal discovery
algorithms. In this article, we shall consider the question of what some prominent causal discovery algorithms have
to say about the causal structure that might underlie quantum correlations, in particular those that violate Bell
inequalities.
Suppose that one conducts measurements on a pair of systems that have been prepared together, and then removed
to distant locations such that the outcome at each wing of the experiment is outside the future light cone of the
measurement choice in the other wing. Suppose further that one finds that the correlations so obtained violate Bell
inequalities. If one insists on a causal explanation of these correlations, then it would seem that one must admit
that the causes must propagate faster than the speed of light. But this is in tension with the fact that one cannot
send signals faster than the speed of light. We take this tension to be the mystery of Bell’s theorem: if there are
indeed superluminal causes, then why can’t we use them to send superluminal signals? In this article, we will show
that the principles behind causal discovery algorithms can clarify the nature of this tension. We also show that
this tension persists in more exotic proposals for achieving a causal explanation of Bell inequality violations such as
superdeterminism, which is an assumption that at least one of the measurement settings is influenced by a variable
that is a common cause of the outcome on the opposite wing (and hence this setting variable is not freely chosen),
and retrocausation, wherein causes propagate counter to the standard direction of time.
We consider the most prominent causal discovery algorithms, which take as their input the set of conditional
independence relations that hold among the observed variables. No other feature of the probability distribution is
relevant for them.1 Our analysis will reveal that such algorithms do not capture the insights of Bell’s theorem.
1These algorithms also look only at statistical independences. They do not consider algorithmic independences, which have recently been
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2It follows that there is an opportunity for researchers in the field of quantum foundations with expertise on Bell’s
theorem to improve upon existing causal discovery algorithms. Indeed, in the time since a preprint of this article
first appeared, the process has already begun. Inspired by entropic Bell inequalities and building on the work of
Ref. [4], it has recently been shown in Ref. [5] that the causal structure implies certain entropic inequalities on the
joint probability distribution. We anticipate that there are many more opportunities for improvements to causal
inference based on ideas from the field of quantum foundations.2
The distinction between causal and inferential concepts is an instance of the distinction between ontic concepts
(those pertaining to reality) and epistemic concepts (those pertaining to our knowledge of reality). Within the field
of statistics, disentangling causal and inferential concepts is notoriously difficult and controversial, as is the question
of when causal claims are supported by the observed correlations. In the quantum realm, where there is even less
agreement about which parts of the formalism refer to ontic concepts and which refer to epistemic concepts, the
problem is compounded [7]. As such, we shall try to present our analysis in a manner that does not presume any
particular interpretation of quantum theory. For instance, given that different interpretations disagree on whether
quantum theory implies an objective indeterminism in nature or not, we shall not presume any particular answer to
this question. Instead, we simply focus on the operational predictions of the theory.
Some previous work has already considered Bell’s theorem from the perspective of causal discovery algorithms.
In particular, the books by Pearl [1] and by SGS [2] comment briefly on the question. They both assert that Bell’s
theorem forces a dilemma between (i) abandoning a particular notion of locality, that there are no superluminal causal
influences, and (ii) abandoning the assumption that if two variables are statistically dependent, then this is explained
either by the existence of a cause from one to the other or a common cause acting on both, or a combination of
the two mechanisms. Assumption (ii) underlies what is called the “causal Markov condition”, but we will refer to it
here simply as Reichenbach’s principle; in a slogan, it asserts that correlations must be explained causally. One can
legitimately quibble with the claim that Bell’s theorem forces such a dilemma on the grounds that there are other
assumptions that go into the theorem: the absence of superdeterminism (an assumption that is often characterized as
the existence of freedom in the choice of settings), and the absence of retrocausal influences, for instance. Nonetheless,
this is an improvement over the standard characterization of Bell’s theorem as forcing a dilemma between abandoning
locality and abandoning realism. It has always been rather unclear what precisely is meant by “realism”. Norsen has
considered various philosophical notions of realism and concluded that none seem to have the feature that one could
hope to save locality by abandoning them [8]. For instance, if realism is taken to be a commitment to the existence
of an external world, then the notion of locality – that every causal influence between physical systems propagates
subluminally – already presupposes realism. Furthermore, we will show that the tools of causal inference can also be
used to argue for the implausibility of superdeterminism and retrocausal influences.
Our first conclusion is a relatively straightforward one. We note that in the case of a Bell scenario, where a pair
of systems is prepared together then separated and each subjected to a measurement, all correlations exhibit the
following conditional independence relations among the observable variables:
1. Marginal independence of the measurement setting variables,
2. No-signalling, that is, conditional independence of the outcome at one wing of the experiment and the setting
at the opposite wing given the setting at the first wing.
Except for independences that are due to special degeneracies in the quantum state, these are the only conditional
independences arising in Bell scenarios. These independences characterize both the correlations that satisfy all the Bell
inequalities, and the correlations that violate some Bell inequality. Therefore, if the causal discovery algorithm takes
as its input not the full distribution but only the conditional independence relations that hold in the distribution (as
is the case with the prominent such algorithms), then this algorithm cannot distinguish correlations that violate Bell
inequalities from correlations that satisfy Bell inequalities. The input to such algorithms is simply too impoverished
to see the difference. It follows that the causal distinctions that do exist between these correlations — those that
are implied by Bell’s theorem — cannot be recognized by these algorithms. They may consequently make incorrect
assessments of what causal structure is implied by a given set of correlations.
shown to encode information about the causal structure. In particular, Sun et al.[3] have shown that one can make use of the fact that
the conditional distribution of an effect given its causes is typically a smoother distribution than the marginal distribution of the effect,
and the marginal distribution of a cause is typically a smoother distribution than the conditional distribution of the cause given some of
its effects.
2Other work in the field of machine learning has appealed to statistical features besides conditional independence relations, but not the
features of correlations that are relevant for Bell’s theorem. Peters et al.[6] demonstrate that if one is promised an additive noise model,
then features of the joint distribution can often distinguish cause from effect in the case of a distribution on a pair of variables, where
there are no conditional independence relations to guide the analysis.
3By explicitly applying the standard causal discovery algorithms to the conditional independence relations that
characterize a Bell scenario, we draw attention to the fact that the output of such algorithms must be interpreted
with great care, lest one be led to an incorrect conclusion about the viability of certain causal explanations. We look
at both the case where one presumes that the settings and outcomes are the only causally relevant variables, i.e., the
case of no hidden variables, and the case where one allows hidden variables.
Finally, we set aside the details of existing algorithms and consider simply what the core principles underlying
these algorithms imply about the possibility of causal explanations of Bell inequality violations. We demonstrate that
any causal model that can hope to explain Bell-inequality-violating correlations (or even to explain Bell-inequality-
satisfying correlations without recourse to hidden variables) has the feature that in order to explain the conditional
independencies among the observed variables, in particular the no-signalling constraints, it must involve a fine-tuning
of the causal parameters.
So, in the end, we obtain a characterization of Bell’s theorem that is quite far from its standard characterization
as a denial of “local realism”. The assumptions that go into this new characterization are: the framework of causal
models, which incorporates Reichenbach’s principle that correlations should be explained causally, as well as the
principle that conditional independence relations should not be explained by fine-tuning. As we shall see, the no
fine-tuning principle, applied to the observed independences in a Bell scenario (including the lack of superluminal
signals), implies the lack of superluminal causal influences, which is Bell’s notion of local causality. So Bell’s notion
of local causality is derived as one particular consequence of no fine-tuning in this approach. The real innovation of
this approach, however, is that the no fine-tuning principle together with the observed indepedences also rule out
superdeterminism and retrocausal influences. It follows that all three of the main approaches for providing a causal
explanation of Bell correlations, superluminal causes, superdeterminism and retrocausal influences, are unsatisfactory,
and they are all unsatisfactory for the same reason.
Our approach demonstrates that Bell’s theorem can be understood as a statement about the possibility of a causal
account of quantum correlations. This characterization is an improvement over the standard one for several reasons.
First, we believe that the question of what constitutes a causal explanation of correlations is more clearly defined than
the question of what constitutes a realist explanation of those correlations. Of course, if one likes, one can take the
notion of causal explanation to be an elucidation of the notion of realism at play in Bell’s theorem. In other words,
one could take the view that an explanation should be described as realist only if it is causal. Indeed, the views of
many proponents of anti-realism in quantum theory are aptly characterized as a denial of the need to provide a causal
explanation of quantum correlations. The second advantage of our characterization is that the fine-tuning criticism
applies to all of the various attempts to provide a causal explanation of Bell inequality violations. Accounts in terms
of superluminal causes, superdeterminism or retrocausal influences are found to fall under a common umbrella. The
conspiratorial flavour of each such account can be formalized as a need for fine-tuning.
II. CAUSAL STRUCTURES AND CAUSAL MODELS
The modern approach to the formal study of causality considers in some detail the significance of interventions and
counterfactuals for defining the notion of a causal relation [1, 2]. There is a large literature on whether these sorts of
definitions are adequate [9]. Although questions of this sort are relevant to a discussion of Bell’s theorem, they will
not be the focus of this article. We begin by describing the mathematical formalism that is relevant for describing
the causal discovery algorithms in Refs. [1] and [2]. We follow the presentation of these authors.
A causal structure is a set of variables V and a set of ordered pairs of distinct variables 〈X,Y 〉 specifying that
X is a direct cause of Y relative to V.
Being in a relationship of direct causation is a property that is defined relative to the set of variables being
considered. If one considers a larger set which includes more variables, then what was a direct causal relation in the
first set might become a mediated causal relation in the second.
Such causal structures can be represented conveniently by directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). A directed graph
G corresponds to a set of vertices and a set of directed edges among the vertices (a vertex cannot be connected to
itself). The acyclic property asserts that there are no directed paths in the graph that begin and end at the same
vertex. DAGs represent causal structures in the obvious manner: every variable in V is represented by a vertex, and
for every pair of variables 〈X,Y 〉 where X is a direct cause of Y, there is a directed edge in the graph between the
associated vertices 3.
3One can imagine more general notions of causation wherein directed cycles are allowed, but we will not consider such notions here.
4As is standard, we use the terminology of family relations in the obvious manner: if X is a cause of Y , direct or
mediated, then X is said to be an ancestor of Y , and Y is said to be a descendent of X. If X is a direct cause of Y ,
then X is said to be a parent of Y . The set of all parents of a variable X will be denoted Pa(X) and the set of all
nondescendents of a variable X will be denoted Nd(X). The variables in the causal structure that have no parents
will be called exogenous, while those with parents will be called endogenous.
A deterministic causal model consists of a causal structure and a set Θ of causal and statistical parameters.
The causal parameters describe the functional relations that fix the values of every variable X given its parents Pa(X)
in the causal structure, that is, for every X they describe a function f specifying X = f(Pa(X)). The statistical
parameters specify a probability distribution over the exogenous variables, that is, a distribution P (X) for every
exogenous X.
An example of a deterministic causal model is given in Fig. 1.
S
W
T
YX
U V Model parameters
P (S)
P (T )
P (U)
P (V )
P (W )
X = fX(S, T, Y, U,W )
Y = fY (T, V,W )
FIG. 1: An example of a deterministic causal model.
The notion of a general causal model (not necessarily deterministic) can be explained as follows. We start with a
deterministic causal model and modify it in a particular way. When an exogenous variable U is the parent of only a
single other variable, say X (i.e. U is not a common cause of two or more variables), it is possible to eliminate U from
the causal structure, and to replace the deterministic dependence of X on its original set of parents with a probabilistic
dependence on its new set of parents. Specifically, if the deterministic causal model specifies that X = f(Pa(X)) for
some function f (here Pa(X) includes U) then the new causal model specifies a conditional probability P (X|Pa′(X))
(here Pa′(X) are the parents relative to the new causal structure, which excludes U). Specifically, the conditional
probability is defined by P (X|Pa(X)) = ∑U δX,f(Pa′(X),U)P (U).
It follows that a general causal model consists of a causal structure and a set Θ of causal-statistical parameters.
The causal-statistical parameters specify a conditional probability distribution for every variable given its causal
parents, P (X|Pa(X))4. Exogenous variables have the null set for their causal parents, so that to condition on their
parents is not to condition at all. Consequently, for the exogenous variables, the causal-statistical parameters simply
specify the unconditioned distributions over each of these5.
An example of a general causal model is given in Fig. 2. It can be obtained from the deterministic causal model
of Fig. 1 by eliminating the exogenous variables U and V . (Note that one need not eliminate all exogenous variables
from a deterministic causal model to obtain a nondeterministic causal model– for instance, S and T have not been
eliminated in our example.)
4 We have chosen to call the parameters of a general causal model “causal-statistical” because if the causal model arises from an underlying
deterministic causal model, then the conditional probabilities in the causal model fold together two different sorts of parameters from the
underlying deterministic causal model: functional dependences of variables on their parents, which are causal parameters, and distributions
over the local noise variables, which are statistical parameters.
5Such models are sometimes called Markovian. A more general sort of model, which allows bi-directed edges representing the existence of
an unobserved common cause for a pair of variables, are called semi-Markovian
5S
W
T
YX
Model parameters
P (S)
P (T )
P (W )
P (X|S, T, Y,W )
P (Y |T,W )
FIG. 2: An example of a causal model consisting of a causal structure, represented by a directed acylic graph, and a
set of causal-statistical parameters, specifying the probability of each variable conditioned on its parents.
Deterministic causal models are clearly a special case of causal models where all conditional probabilities correspond
to deterministic functions. It is also clear that for any given causal model, one can always view it as arising from
a deterministic causal model where some exogenous variables have been excluded. To obtain such a deterministic
extension of a causal model, it suffices to add new exogenous variables as parents of every endogenous variable in the
model. For the rest of the article, we will focus on the general notion of a causal model, rather than on deterministic
causal models.
We pause to discuss briefly the possible interpretation of the probabilities in a causal model. One could take a
Bayesian attitude towards these probabilities. In this case, the probability distribution on an exogenous variable U
represents an agent’s degrees of belief about U , and the conditional probability P (X|Pa(X)) represents degrees of
belief about X given its parents. Another possibility is to take a frequentist attitude towards the probabilities. This is
arguably the position adopted by Pearl, who describes the auxiliary variables appearing in a deterministic extension of
a causal model as ‘unmeasurable conditions that Nature governs by some undisclosed probability function’ ([1], p. 44).
One could even interpret the probabilities as propensities, indicating an irreducible randomness in one’s theory (an
option that might be appealing to some when considering the possibility of explaining quantum correlations in terms
of causal models). Our conclusions here will be independent of this choice 6.
It is worth noting that the fact that exogenous variables are assumed to be independently distributed, which is
part of the definition of a causal model, is a consequence of Reichenbach’s principle. The principle asserts that one
must explain all correlations by a causal mechanism, so that if two variables are correlated then either one is a cause
of the other, or there is a common cause acting on both (this is not an exclusive or – it could be that two variables
have be related by both a common cause and a cause-effect relation). In other words, the exogenous variables are by
definition the variables that one takes to be uncorrelated.
Consider the following question: given a causal model, what sorts of correlations can be observed among the
variables? Clearly, there is a set of joint distributions that are possible, depending on the causal-statistical parameters
that we add to the causal structure to get a causal model.
Consider the example from Fig. 2. The causal model predicts that the joint distribution over all the variables should
be
P (X,Y, S, T,W ) = P (W )P (S)P (T )P (Y |T,W )P (X|Y, S, T,W ). (1)
To see this, it suffices to note that in the deterministic extension of this model, depicted in Fig. 1, we have
P (X,Y, S, T,W,U, V ) = P (U)P (V )P (W )P (S)P (T ) δY,fY (T,V,W ) δX,fX(S,T,Y,U,W ), (2)
where δ denotes the Kronecker delta function, δX,Y = 1 if and only if X = Y , and consequently,
P (X,Y, S, T,W ) =
∑
U,V
P (U)P (V )P (W )P (S)P (T ) δY,fY (T,V,W ) δX,fX(S,T,Y,U,W ),
= P (W )P (S)P (T )P (Y |T,W )P (X|Y, S, T,W ) (3)
where P (Y |T,W ) ≡∑V δY,fY (T,V,W )P (V ) and P (X|Y, S, T,W ) ≡∑U δX,fX(S,T,Y,U,W )P (U).
In general, a causal model with variables V ≡ {X1, . . . , Xn} predicts a joint distribution of the form
P (X1, . . . , Xn) =
∏
i=1,...,n
P (Xi|Pa(Xi)). (4)
6Although we ultimately favor the Bayesian interpretation.
6Essentially, one multiplies together the conditional probabilities for every variable given its parents, all of which are
specified by the causal model. For a DAG that is not a complete graph (i.e not every pair of nodes is connected by
an edge), the probability distributions that it supports are a subset of the possible distributions over those variables.
We now turn to another question: what properties do all distributions consistent with a given causal structure have
in common? In other words, what are the features of the joint probability distribution that depend only on the causal
structure and not on the causal-statistical parameters? Conditional independence (CI) relations are an example of
such properties, and they are the ones that most causal discovery algorithms to date have focussed upon.
Recall that variables X and Y are conditionally independent given Z, denoted
(X ⊥ Y | Z)
if any of the following three equivalent conditions hold
1. P (X|Y,Z) = P (X|Z) ∀y, z : P (Y = y, Z = z) > 0,
2. P (Y |X,Z) = P (Y |Z) ∀x, z : P (X = x, Z = z) > 0,
3. P (X,Y |Z) = P (X|Z)P (Y |Z) ∀z : P (Z = z) > 0.
An intuitive account of each of these conditions is as follows: In the context of already knowing Z, (1) learning Y
teaches you nothing about X (i.e. Y teaches you nothing more about X than what you already could infer from
knowing Z), (2) learning X teaches you nothing about Y , and (3) X and Y are independently distributed. Note
that marginal independence of X and Y , where P (X,Y ) = P (X)P (Y ), is simply conditional independence where the
conditioning set is the null set.
The definition of conditional independence implies that certain logical inferences hold among CI relations. In
other words, in a complete set of CI relations, the CI relations need not be logically independent of one another. In
particular, the semi-graphoid axioms specify some inferences that can be drawn among CI relations. They are:
Symmetry: (X ⊥ Y |Z)⇔ (Y ⊥ X |Z)
Decomposition: (X ⊥ YW |Z)⇒ (X ⊥ Y |Z)
Weak Union: (X ⊥ YW |Z)⇒ (X ⊥ Y |ZW )
Contraction: (X ⊥ Y |Z) and (X ⊥ W |ZY )⇒ (X ⊥ YW |Z)
Any set of variables can be considered as a new variable, so each of the variablesX,Y , W and Z appearing in the axioms
should be understood as possibly representing a set of variables. These axioms are quite intuitive. Decomposition, for
instance, states that if, in the context of knowing X, learning W and Y teaches you nothing about U, then learning
W alone teaches you nothing about U .
Note that if one wants to specify all the CI relations that hold for a given probability distribution, it suffices to
specify a generating set, defined to be a set from which the rest can be obtained by the semi-graphoid axioms. In this
paper, the conditional independence relations will typically be specified by a generating set.
With these tools in hand, we can now discuss the central result concerning what properties of a joint probability
distribution can be inferred from the causal structure.
Theorem 1 (Causal Markov condition) In the joint distribution induced by a causal structure, every variable X
is conditionally independent of its nondescendants given its parents,
(X ⊥ Nd (X) | Pa (X)).
This result follows from Eq. (4) because
P (X|Pa(X),Nd(X)) = P (X,Pa(X),Nd(X))
P (Pa(X),Nd(X))
,
=
P (X|Pa(X))∏Y ∈Pa(X),Nd(X) P (Y |Pa(Y ))∏
Y ∈Pa(X),Nd(X) P (Y |Pa(Y ))
,
= P (X|Pa(X)). (5)
The causal Markov condition implies a CI relation for every variable that is not exogenous in the causal structure.
One can then infer additional CI relations from these by the semi-graphoid axioms.
To see these ideas in action, consider again the example from Fig. 2. It turns out that (Y ⊥ S|T ) for this causal
structure, as we now demonstrate. Applying the causal Markov condition to Y , one infers that (Y ⊥ XS|WT ).
7Applying it to W , S and T one infers (W ⊥ ST ), (S ⊥ WT ) and (T ⊥ WS) respectively. By the decomposition
axiom, (Y ⊥ XS|WT ) implies (Y ⊥ S|WT ). From the contraction axiom, (Y ⊥ S|WT ) and (S ⊥ WT ) imply
(S ⊥ YWT ). Finally, from weak union we obtain (S ⊥ YW |T ) and then from decomposition again we have
(S ⊥ Y |T ), which is equivalent by symmetry to (Y ⊥ S|T ).
We see that it can be rather laborious to infer CI relations from the causal Markov condition and the semi-graphoid
axioms. Fortunately, there is a graphical criterion for identifying such relations, known as d-separation [1]. We will
not dwell on this notion here, but we present a brief introduction in App. A.
Note that in addition to the CI relations that are implied by the causal structure, there may be additional CI
relations that are implied by the particular values of the causal-statistical parameters. Such additional CI relations
are problematic for causal discovery algorithms, as we shall see.
III. CAUSAL DISCOVERY ALGORITHMS
We have described the correlations that are possible for a given causal structure. Causal discovery algorithms seek to
solve the inverse problem: starting from correlations among observed variables, can one infer which causal structures
might account for these correlations? Researchers in this area have indeed devised some schemes for narrowing down
the set of causal structures that can yield a natural explanation of the correlations, wherein the notion of naturalness
at play is one that we shall make explicit shortly. The algorithms look to the conditional independences among the
variables to infer information about the causal structure.
In general, causal discovery algorithms may be applied directly to experimental data and in this case one needs to
deal with the subtle issue of how to infer conditional independence relations from a finite sample of a probability dis-
tribution. However, in what follows we are going to apply the causal discovery algorithms directly to the distributions
prescribed by quantum theory, so we needn’t worry about this subtlety.
It is worth reviewing a few basic facts about the output of causal discovery algorithms. First of all, two different
causal structures might support precisely the same probability distributions, so that observation of one of these
distributions necessarily leaves one ignorant about which causal structure is at play. As an example, for three
variables, the three causal structures show in Fig. 3 all support the same set of probability distributions – those
wherein A and B are conditionally independent given C (these are the DAGs wherein A and B are d-separated given
C). (The general conditions under which two causal structures are observationally equivalent is given by theorem
1.2.8 in Ref. [1].)
A C B
(a)
A C B
(b)
A C B
(c)
FIG. 3: The three causal models consistant with the CI relation (A ⊥ B |C)
It follows that causal discovery algorithms will necessarily sometimes yield an equivalence class of causal structures.
When this occurs, additional information is required if one is to narrow down the causal structure to a unique
possibility, for instance information about the temporal order of some of the variables.
Despite this, one can often narrow down the field of causal possibilities significantly. To get a feeling for how this
works, it is useful to start with a very simple example. Suppose that one has three binary-valued variables, denoted
A, B and C. Suppose further that the joint distribution over the triple, P (A,B,C) is such that
(A ⊥ B) i.e. P (A,B) = P (A)P (B),
(A 6⊥ C) i.e. P (A,C) 6= P (A)P (C),
(B 6⊥ C) i.e. P (B,C) 6= P (B)P (C). (6)
What is the natural causal explanation for this sort of correlation? It is as shown in Fig. 4. The marginal independence
of A and B is explained by their being causally independent.
A C B
FIG. 4: The natural causal model for the set of CI given in Eq. (6).
However, there are other possible causal explanations, such as the one given in Fig. 5. The reason this is a possible
explanation is because there are two causal mechanisms by which A and B could become correlated, and it could
8be that the two types of correlations combine in such a way as to leave A and B marginally independent. For this
to happen, however, the parameters in the causal model cannot be chosen arbitrarily and it is in this sense that the
explanation is less natural than the one provided by Fig. 4.
A
C
B
FIG. 5: An unnatural causal model for the set of CI given in Eq. (6)
An example helps to make all of this more explicit. We adopt the following notational convention (inspired by the
representation of mixtures in quantum theory)
P (A) = [x] means P (A = x) = 1,
P (A,B) = [x][y] ≡ [xy] means P (A = x,B = y) = 1.
Consider the following joint distribution, which has the dependences described in Eq. (6),
P (A,B,C) =
1
4
[000] +
1
4
[010] +
1
4
[100] +
1
4
[111]. (7)
We can easily verify that
P (A,B) =
(
1
2
[0] +
1
2
[1]
)(
1
2
[0] +
1
2
[1]
)
,
so that A and B are indeed marginally independent. We also have
P (A,C) = P (B,C) =
1
2
[00] +
1
4
[10] +
1
4
[11],
so that A and C are marginally dependent, as are B and C .
The natural explanation is achieved by assuming that the causal structure is as given in Fig. 4, and the priors over
the exogenous variables and the conditional probabilities for the endogenous variables are as follows:
P (A) =
1
2
[0] +
1
2
[1],
P (B) =
1
2
[0] +
1
2
[1],
P (C|A,B) = [A ·B] ,
where A · B denotes the product of the values of A and B. Thus in this causal model, A and B are each chosen
uniformly at random, and C is obtained as their product (equivalently, as the logical AND of A and B). One can
easily verify that P (A)P (B)P (C|A,B) yields the distribution of Eq. (7).
The alternative explanation assumes the causal structure of Fig. 5, with parameters
P (C) =
3
4
[0] +
1
4
[1],
P (B|C = 0) = 2
3
[0] +
1
3
[1],
P (B|C = 1) = [1],
P (A|B = 0, C = 0) = 1
2
[0] +
1
2
[1],
P (A|B = 1, C) = [C].
(We need not specify P (A|B = 0, C = 1) because P (B = 0, C = 1) = 0.) The joint distribution one obtains is again
that of Eq. (7).
9The difference between the two explanations becomes clear when we vary the parameters. If we change the param-
eters in the first model, for instance to
P (A) = w[0] + (1− w)[1],
P (B) = w′[0] + (1− w′) [1],
P (C|A,B) = w′′ [AB] + (1− w′′)[A⊕B],
where ⊕ denotes addition modulo 2, then the joint distribution is no longer of the form of Eq. (7), but it is still
true that A is independent of B, while A and C are dependent, and B and C are dependent. On the other hand,
modifications to the parameters in the second model do not preserve the pattern of dependences and independences
among A, B and C.
The first causal structure explains the pattern of statistical dependences and independences in a manner that is
robust to changes in the parameters of the causal model, whereas the second causal structure does not. Causal
discovery algorithms therefore favour the first model over the second.
In the example we have used, all of the variables in the causal model were observed variables. In general (and
especially in a quantum context), one might only observe a subset of the variables that are part of the causal model.
Even in this case, however, one should prefer those causal models wherein the conditional independences in the
probability distribution over the observed variables are stable to changes in the causal-statistical parameters.
This is the main assumption of the causal discovery algorithms, usually called faithfulness [2] or stability [1]. For
a physicist, it is natural to call this an assumption of no fine-tuning. It is the key assumption in our analysis, so we
highlight it:
Faithfulness (no fine-tuning): The probability distribution induced by a causal model M (over the
variables in M or some subset thereof) is faithful (not fine-tuned) if its conditional independences continue
to hold for any variation of the causal-statistical parameters in M.
In other words, all conditional independences should be a consequence of the causal structure alone, not a result of
the causal-statistical parameters taking some particular set of values. If one assumes a uniform prior over the space
of causal-statistical parameters, then the parameter choices that can explain conditional independence relations that
are not implied by the causal structure are found to have measure zero.
The second major assumption of CI-based causal discovery algorithms is an appeal to Occam’s razor, an assumption
that one should favour the most simple or most minimal model that explains the statistics. Again, it can be applied
both for the case where the observed variables are all the variables in the causal model, or the case where they are
some subset thereof.
A causal model M will be said to simulate another causal model M ′ on a set of variables V if for every choice of
causal-statistical parameters on M ′, there is a choice of causal-statistical parameters on M such that M yields the
same distribution over V as M ′ does. We can now define the assumption of minimality.
Minimality: Given two causal models M and M ′ that induce a given probability distribution over a set
of observed variables VO (in general a subset of the variables postulated by each causal model), if M
′ can
simulate M on VO but M cannot simulate M
′ on VO, then M is preferred to M ′ as a causal explanation
of the probability distribution over VO.
At first sight, it might seem odd to prefer M over M ′ given that M is consistent with fewer distributions over V
than M ′ is. But the fact that M can explain less than M ′ implies that M is more falsifiable than M ′, and in the
version of Occam’s razor espoused by CI-based causal discovery algorithms, the degree of falsifiability is the figure of
merit that one seeks to optimize. More falsifiable theories are to be preferred because, in Pearl’s words, “they provide
the scientist with less opportunities to overfit the data ‘hindsightedly’ and therefore command greater credibility if
a fit is found” ([1], p. 49). It follows that a causal model is deemed most simple if it has the least expressive power,
while still doing justice to the observed probability distribution. Note that M might be preferred to M ′ as a causal
explanation of the probability distribution over VO even though M may require more latent variables and/or more
causal arrows than M ′; “the preference for simplicity [...] is gauged by the expressive power of a structure, not by its
syntactic description.” ([1], p. 46). We will see some examples of the consequences of the assumption of minimality
shortly.
It is worth remembering that causal discovery algorithms are fallible. They are best considered a heuristic, an
inference to the best explanation. Indeed, Pearl likens the faithfulness assumption in causal discovery to the following
kind of inference: you see a chair before you and infer that there is a single chair rather than two chairs positioned
such that the one hides the other ([1], p. 48). The task of causal discovery can be understood as “an inductive game
that scientists play against Nature” ([1], p. 42).
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A. Example of causal discovery assuming no latent variables
Variables that are not observed but which are causally relevant are called latent variables, or hidden variables.
In this section, we assume that the observed variables are the only causally relevant variables, i.e. that there are
no hidden variables. We look at a particular example of how faithfulness can help to determine candidate causal
structures from a pattern of dependences in this case. The scheme is equivalent to the one introduced by Wermuth
and Lauritzen [10].
Suppose one is interested in answering the question “Does smoking cause lung cancer?” For each member of a
population of individuals, the value of a variable S is known, indicating whether the individual smoked or not, and
the value of a variable C is known, indicating whether they developed cancer or not. Suppose a correlation between
S and C is observed. Furthermore, suppose that one also has access to a third variable T, indicating whether the
individual had tar in their lungs or not, and suppose that it is found that S and C are conditionally independent
given T. In other words, after conditioning on whether or not there is tar in the lungs, smoking and lung cancer are
no longer correlated. Finally, imagine that these three variables are assumed to be the only causally relevant ones
(we will consider the alternative to this assumption further on). What causal structure is natural given the observed
conditional independence relation? Because we wish to make it very clear how these algorithms work, we will not
simply specify what causal structure they return. Instead, we will look “under the hood” of these algorithms.
We begin by considering every possible hypothesis about the causal ordering. A causal ordering of variables is an
ordering wherein causal influences can only propagate from one variable to another if the second is higher in the order
than the first.
S
T
C
FIG. 6: The most general DAG for the causal ordering S < T < C.
For instance, consider the causal ordering S < T < C. The most general causal structure consistent with such
an ordering is given in Fig. 6. To get a causal model, we need to supplement this with conditional probabilities of
every variable given its parents, that is, P (S), P (T |S), and P (C|T, S). The joint distribution that this model defines
is simply
P (S, T, C) = P (S)P (T |S)P (C |T, S).
Given that any distribution can be decomposed in this form, by choosing the conditional probabilities appropriately,
we can model any joint distribution P (S, T, C). But now we make use of the additional information we have about
the joint distribution, namely that (S ⊥ C |T ). This implies that we can take the parameters in the causal model to
be such that P (C |T, S) = P (C |T ), so that the joint distribution can be written as
P (S, T, C) = P (S)P (T |S)P (C |T ),
and we can drop the causal arrow from S to C, so that the underlying causal structure is simply given by Fig. 7.
S
T
C
FIG. 7: DAG that captures (S ⊥ C |T ) for the causal ordering S < T < C.
This simplified causal structure cannot generate an arbitrary probability distribution, but it can generate one
wherein (S ⊥ C |T ). It is a candidate for the true causal structure.
One then simply repeats this procedure for every possible choice of the causal ordering. For instance, for the
ordering C < T < S, the most general causal structure is the one shown in Fig. 8. The decomposition of the joint
probability corresponding to this causal structure is
P (S, T, C) = P (C)P (T |C)P (S|C, T ),
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S
T
C
FIG. 8: The most general DAG for the causal ordering C < T < S.
but the constraint (S ⊥ C|T ) implies that one substitute P (S |C, T ) = P (S |T ) in the causal model. Therefore, by
the assumption of minimality, we drop the causal arrow from C to S, yielding a causal structure of the form given in
Fig. 9. So this is another possible causal structure.
S
T
C
FIG. 9: DAG that captures (S ⊥ C |T ) for the causal ordering C < T < S.
Sometimes different causal orderings lead to the same causal structure, for instance, the orderings T < S < C and
T < C < S both yield the structure given in Fig. 10.
S
T
C
FIG. 10: DAG that captures (S ⊥ C |T ) for the causal orderings T < S < C and T < C < S..
Other causal orderings, such as S < C < T and C < S < T are such that the conditional independence constraint
does not lead to any simplification of the causal structure. For instance, for S < C < T, the joint distribution
decomposes as P (S, T, C) = P (S)P (C|S)P (T |C, S), and none of the terms on the right-hand side can be simplified
by (S ⊥ C|T ). These two orderings lead to the two causal structures in Fig. 11.
Therefore, in this example, the six possible causal orderings have led to five candidates for the causal structure,
depicted in Figs 7, 9, 10 and 11. However, the two causal structures shown in Fig. 11 do not satisfy stability, so only
the other three are viable.
Suppose finally that in addition to the information about conditional independence, one has information which
rules out certain causal orderings. For instance, in the example we are considering, suppose one has the additional
information that tar in the lungs always appears after a person has smoked, never before. It is then reasonable to
rule out any causal structure that has T < S. This rules out Figs 9 and 10. At the end, the only candidate causal
structure which is left is the one given in Fig. 7, which says that smoking causes tar in the lungs which causes lung
cancer.
Of course, it needn’t be the case that these observed variables are the only ones that are causally relevant. For
instance, there might be an unobserved genetic factor that predisposes people both to smoke and to develop lung
cancer. Indeed, tobacco companies were quick to point out the possibility of explaining the observed correlation
between smoking and cancer in terms of such a genetic factor. So it is useful also to have causal discovery algorithms
that allow for latent variables.
Before moving on to algorithms that posit latent variables, we pause to note that the algorithm described here is
proven to be correct in the sense that if there exists a set of causal structures that are minimal and faithful to the
observed correlations, then the algorithm will return these structures [10].
More efficient versions of this algorithm are described elsewhere, for instance, the Inductive causation (IC) algorithm
described in Pearl [1], which is equivalent to the SGS algorithm of Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines [2]. There have also
been many proposals to further improve the efficiency of these algorithms (See Refs. [1] and [2] for details) . These
algorithms have been proven to be correct in the sense that if there exist causal models that are minimal and faithful,
then the algorithms will return them.
12
S
T
C
(a)
S
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C
(b)
FIG. 11: DAGs that capture (S ⊥ C |T ) for the causal orderings S < C < T (11a) and C < S < T (11b).
B. Example of causal discovery allowing for latent variables
Causal discovery in the case where one allows latent variables is more complicated. We begin by considering some
of the consequences of the assumption of minimality for causal models with latent variables.
First of all, it is clear that one needn’t consider any causal models wherein a latent variable mediates a relation
between two observed variables, because the set of distributions over the observed variables that can be explained
by such a model is no greater than the set that can be explained by simply postulating a direct causal influence
between the observed variables. Similarly, positing a latent variable that is a common effect of the observed variables
does not change the distributions that can be supported on the observed variables. Latent variables have nontrivial
consequences for the observed distribution only when they act as common causes of the observed variables.
Consider the following suggestion for a causal explanation of the correlations among a set of observed variables:
there are no causal influences among any of the observed variables, but there is a single latent variable that has a
causal influence on each of them. By choosing the latent variable to take as many values as there are valuations of
the observed variables, one can explain any correlation among the observed variables in this way. However, if there
exists another causal model that can only reproduce a smaller set of possible correlations, while reproducing the
observed correlations, then the principle of minimality dictates that we should prefer the latter. Of course, one could
imagine that further investigations (involving interventions, for instance) might vindicate the explanation that is less
falsifiable over the one that is more falsifiable. This simply is another reminder that causal discovery algorithms are
not infallible — they are heuristics for identifying the most plausible causal explanations given the evidence.
Now we come to the most subtle part of the causal discovery algorithms that posit latent variables. There is a
difference between applying the criterion of minimality among a set of causal structures that are consistent with a given
distribution over the observed variables and applying the criterion of minimality among a set of causal structures that
are consistent with a given set of conditional independence relations over the observed variables. As we’ve mentioned
before, the algorithms described in Refs. [1] and [2] look only at the CI relations and consequently they follow the
latter course. This choice is a significant shortcoming of many prominent causal discovery algorithms, but we will
defer this criticism until the end of this section.
For the moment, we simply explain the consequences of this choice. To do so, it is useful to divide the causal
structures that are consistent with a given distribution over a set of observed variables into two sorts. The first kind
is such that all the latent variables it posits are common causes for at most two of the observed variables. We’ll say
that such a causal structure is limited to pairwise common causes. The other kind is unrestricted, so that more than
two observed variables can be directly influenced by a single latent variable.
It is possible to show [11] that for a given set of CI relations among a set of observed variables, if a causal model
M generates those CI relations faithfully (that is, as a consequence of the causal structure, rather than the causal-
statistical parameters), then there is another causal model M ′ that achieves the same CI relations faithfully but which
is limited to pairwise common causes. The assumption of minimality makes M ′ preferred to M .
Therefore, if one is only applying the criterion of minimality among a set of causal structures that are consistent
with the CI relations among the observed variables, then one need only look among causal models that incorporate
pairwise common causes. This is precisely what the standard causal discovery algorithms do.
There is a simplified graphical language for representing the set of causal structures that can be output by these
algorithms. Rather than using a DAG that includes both the latent and the observed variables in the causal structure,
one uses a graph which only includes the observed variables as nodes but uses a larger variety of edges among these
nodes to specify the causal relation that might hold among the associated variables. For instance, a double-headed
arrow between variables X and Y signifies that there is a common cause of X and Y (Fig. 12). An arrow that has
a circle rather than an arrowhead at one end represents either a common cause or a direct causal influence or both
(Fig. 13). Finally, an undirected edge with a circle at both its head and its tail represents any of the five possible
ways in which a pair of variables might be related (Fig. 14). In this way, a set of causal structures that include latent
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variables can be summarized in a single graph. Following Pearl, we call such graphs patterns 7.
X Y ≡ X
Λ
Y
FIG. 12: The interpretation of a bidirected edge in terms of a DAG.
X Y ≡ X Y or
X
Λ
Y
or
X
Λ
Y
FIG. 13: The interpretation of a directed edge with a circle at its tail in terms of DAGs.
X Y ≡ X Y or X Y or
X
Λ
Y
or
X
Λ
Y
or
X
Λ
Y
FIG. 14: The interpretation of an undirected edge with circles at head and tail in terms of DAGs.
In order to infer the causal structures with only pairwise common causes that are consistent with a given pattern,
it is not sufficient to simply substitute for every undirected edge (or bi-directed edge or directed edge with decorated
tail) all the possibilities consistent with that edge, as enumerated in Figs. 12, 13 and 14. One must eliminate some of
the combinations. The definition of a v-structure in a DAG is a head-to-head collision of two arrows on a node such
that the parents do not exert any direct causal influence on one another. The prescription for finding all the DAGs
consistent with a pattern is to consider all the combinations of possibilities that do not create a new v-structure.
The IC* algorithm described in Pearl [1] (which is equivalent to the Causal Inference (CI) algorithm described in
SGS [2]) takes conditional independence relations as input and returns a pattern. This algorithm is correct in the
sense that if there exist causal structures with only pairwise common causes that are faithful to the observed CI
relations, then the algorithm will return the minimal structures within this set.8 We will not review the details of the
algorithm here, but we will apply it to a simple example to get a feeling for how it works.
Consider the smoking example again, where the observed variables S, T and C are found to satisfy S ⊥ C |T . The
pattern returned by the IC* algorithm in this case is shown in Fig. 15.
For each undirected edge in this pattern, there are five possibilities in the DAG for what connection holds between
the nodes, as displayed in Fig. 14. In Fig. 16 we display all twenty-five combinations of such possibilities. We have also
shaded out each of the combinations that introduces a new v-structure – these combinations are not candidates for
7More precisely, the analogue of the particular graphs we consider here are Pearl’s “marked patterns”. These have also been called “partially
oriented inducing path graphs” in SGS. We will follow SGS’s notational convention rather than Pearl’s when drawing such graphs.
8Note, however, that the existence of a causal structure that reproduces the CI relations does not guarantee the existence of one that
reproduces the observed distribution, as we will see at the end of this section. In this sense, the algorithm may still fail to return a valid
causal explanation of the observed distribution.
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T
C
FIG. 15: Output pattern of IC* algorithm for input S ⊥ C|T .
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T
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Λ Μ
FIG. 16: The causal structures returned by the IC* algorithm when the input is a distribution over observed
variables S, T and C with (S ⊥ C|T ). Those that introduce a new v-structure are shaded out.
the causal structure according to the IC* algorithm. Hence, the nine causal structures that remain are the candidates
returned by IC*.
How does this answer embody the principles of causal discovery? First, the fact that one unpacks the pattern into
causal structures with only pairwise common causes is a consequence of the minimality assumption, as we discussed
at the beginning of this section. This is the reason that we do not find in the output of the algorithm any latent
variable that is a common cause of all three variables S, T and C.
Now consider the question of why there is neither a direct causal influence between S and C nor a latent variable
that acts as a common cause for the pair. The answer is simply that if either of these sorts of influences were acting,
then we would not find (S ⊥ C|T ); learning S would teach us something about C even though T is known. In the
context of our example, this eliminates the possibility put forward by the tobacco companies of a hypothetical genetic
factor that both predisposes people to smoke and to get lung cancer.
We need not consider the cases where there is also no connection between S and T nor the cases where there is also
no connection between T and C because by assumption (S ⊥ C|T ) is the only CI relation and therefore (S 6⊥ T ) and
(T 6⊥ C).
It follows that the twenty-five structures displayed in Fig. 16 are the only possibilities that remain among all possible
causal structures with pairwise common causes. So, to explain why the output of the algorithm is justified we need
only explain why one should eliminate those that introduce a new v-structure. First note that if one conditions on a
variable that is the common effect of two other variables, then we expect a dependence between those variables (for
instance, in digital logic, knowing that the output of an AND gate is 0 implies that the two inputs cannot both be
1). Therefore for each causal structure that includes a v-structure on T , we would expect that conditioning on T
induces a dependence between the roots of the v-structure, and because one of these roots is always correlated with
S and the other with C, this would imply a dependence between S and C, contradicting the fact that (S ⊥ C|T ).
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Alternatively, we can infer that a causal structure including a v-structure on T contradicts the relation (S ⊥ C|T )
using the d-separation criterion.
What does this imply about whether smoking causes lung cancer? Suppose that we make use of the same additional
information as we considered in Sec. III A, namely, that tar in the lungs is always found to occur after smoking, never
before. We can then eliminate all causal structures with an arrow from T to S. What remains are the three options
in Fig. 17. They are: (i) smoking causes tar in the lungs which causes cancer, (ii) there is a latent variable that is a
common cause of smoking and having tar in the lungs, and (iii) both mechanisms are in play. If option (ii) holds then
smoking is not a cause of cancer and, unlike the hypothesis of a genetic factor that predisposes people both to smoke
and to develop lung cancer, it is consistent with the observation that tar screens off smoking from cancer. Of course,
this hypothesis remains implausible if one cannot identify (or imagine) any factor that screens off smoking from tar
in the lungs.
S
T
C S
T
C
Λ
S
T
C
Λ
FIG. 17: The causal structures that remain if the ordering S < T is assumed.
We previously highlighted the fact that the causal discovery algorithms of Refs. [1] and [2] apply the principle of
minimality within the set of causal structures that are consistent with the CI relations in the observed distribution,
not within the set of those that are consistent with the observed distribution itself. This can be a problem because
these two sets of causal structures can be different [11].
It is best to illustrate this with an example. Consider the case of a triple of observed variables, X, Y and Z. We
will compare two causal models. The first posits a latent variable λ which has a direct causal influence on all three
observed variables. The second posits three latent variables, λ, µ and ν, each of which has a direct causal influence
on a distinct pair of observed variables 9. The two models are illustrated in Fig. 18.
X
Z
Y
Λ X
Z
Y
Λ Μ
Ν
FIG. 18: Two candidate causal structures for explaining correlations between X, Y and Z using latent variables.
The two structures imply precisely the same set of CI relations among the observed variables, namely, the null set.
However, there are distributions over the triple of observed variables that are only consistent with the first model
and not the second. For instance, a joint distribution wherein the three observed variables X, Y and Z are close to
perfectly correlated10 cannot be generated from the second causal structure for any choice of causal parameters [13, 14].
Therefore, if this is the distribution one has observed, then the second causal structure is not a candidate for the
underlying causal model. However, the CI relations one observes for such a distribution are consistent with the second
causal structure. So if the input to one’s causal discovery algorithm is limited to these relations, then the algorithm
can return a causal structure that is inconsistent with the observed distribution. Indeed, because the first causal
structure can simulate the second, the principle of minimality would naturally lead one to prefer the second, even
though it is inconsistent with the observed distribution.
We will see that this deficiency of CI-based causal discovery algorithms becomes manifest when one applies them
to correlations that violate a Bell inequality.
9This causal scenario has also been considered in the context of a discussion of quantum correlations in Refs. [12, 13].
10We cannot take the case where they are perfectly correlated because we want our example to be of a distribution that is faithful to the
first causal structure and perfect correlation would imply that any two variables are conditionally independent given the third.
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IV. APPLYING CAUSAL DISCOVERY ALGORITHMS TO QUANTUM CORRELATIONS
We now turn to the question of what these algorithms tell us about quantum correlations. We consider only Bell-
type experiments involving two systems, two possible settings for each measurement and two possible outcomes for
each measurement. Let S and T be the binary variables that specify which measurement was performed on the left
and right wings of the experiment respectively, and let A and B be the binary variables that specify the outcomes of
the measurements on the left and right wings respectively.
Bell’s theorem derives constraints on P (AB |ST ) from assumptions about the causal structure [15]. These as-
sumptions — which Bell justified by appeal to the space-like separation of the two wings of the experiment and the
impossibility of superluminal causal influences — are that A is the joint effect of the setting variable S and a common
cause variable λ, while B is the joint effect of the setting variable T and λ. The causal structure corresponding to this
assumption is presented in Fig. 19.
S
Λ
T
BA
FIG. 19: The causal structure corresponding to Bell’s notion of local causality.
This structure implies the following conditional independence relations,
(A ⊥ BT |Sλ) and (B ⊥ AS |Tλ).
Bell called his assumption local causality and formalized it in terms of these conditional independences. These in
turn imply that P (AB |STλ) = P (A |Sλ)P (B |Tλ), which is known as factorizability. From this condition, together
with the assumption that there are no correlations between the settings and the hidden variables,
(S ⊥ Tλ) and (T ⊥ Sλ),
one can infer that P (AB |ST ) must satisfy the Bell inequalities [15, 16]. Bell’s assumption about the causal structure
also implies no superluminal signalling:
No-signalling: (A ⊥ T |S) and (B ⊥ S |T ). (8)
The fact that quantum correlations can violate Bell inequalities shows that they cannot be explained using the
causal structure of Fig. 19.
We will now consider the inverse problem to the one considered by Bell. Rather than attempting to infer constraints
on correlations from assumptions about the causal structure, we will attempt to infer conclusions about possible causal
structures from the nature of the correlations that arise in quantum theory. This is the sort of problem that the causal
discovery algorithms were designed to solve.
We will contrast two examples of quantum correlations: one which violates the Bell inequalities and the other which
satisfies the Bell inequalities.
For the latter, we will take a version of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiment [17] in terms of qubits (first
proposed by Bohm for spin-1/2 systems [18]). The pair are prepared in the maximally entangled state
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|+z〉 |+z〉+ |−z〉 |−z〉) (9)
where |±z〉 are the eigenstates of spin along the zˆ axis. On each wing, the two choices of measurement are between
a pair of mutually unbiased bases (the same pair for each wing). For instance, we may measure spin along the zˆ or
xˆ axes, as illustrated in Fig. 20. In this case, if the same measurement is made on both wings (both zˆ or both xˆ),
one sees perfect correlation between the outcomes, while if different measurements are made (zˆ on one and xˆ on the
other), then one sees no correlation between the outcomes. It is well known that these sorts of correlations do not
violate any Bell inequality, which is to say that they can be explained by a locally causal model.
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FIG. 20: Measurement axes for generating EPR correlations given the quantum state |Ψ〉 of Eq. (9)
The other sort of correlation we consider will be those exhibited in the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH)
experiment. We can take the pair of spins to be prepared in the same maximally entangled state |Ψ〉 as for the EPR
scenario, and the pair of measurements on the left wing to also be of spin along the zˆ or xˆ axes. However, on the
right wing, the pair of possible measurements are of spin along the (zˆ + xˆ)/
√
2 axis or along the (zˆ − xˆ)/√2 axis, as
indicated in Fig. 21. In this case, one finds that the probability of correlation for the cases (S, T ) = (0, 0), (1, 0) and
(0, 1) is equal to the probability of anticorrelation for the cases (S, T ) = (1, 1) and has the value 12 +
1
2
√
2
' 0.85.
In both the EPR and CHSH scenarios, we assume that the settings S and T are sampled independently.
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FIG. 21: Measurement axes for generating CHSH correlations given the quantum state |Ψ〉 of Eq. (9)
The input to the standard causal discovery algorithms is limited to conditional independence relations, so we begin
by computing the conditional independences that hold for the EPR and CHSH experiments. Rather than specifying
an exhaustive list, we provide a generating set (the rest can be obtained by applying the semi-graphoid axioms). They
are:
EPR: (S ⊥ T ), (A ⊥ T |S), (B ⊥ S |T ), (A ⊥ S), (B ⊥ T ).
CHSH: (S ⊥ T ), (A ⊥ T |S), (B ⊥ S |T ), (A ⊥ S), (B ⊥ T ).
Consider the conditions (A ⊥ S) and (B ⊥ T ). These assert that the outcome on a wing is independent of the
setting on that wing. While true, this independence is not representative of the causal structure. Indeed, it only
holds because of the degeneracy of the Schmidt coefficients in the maximally entangled state. If we instead consider
the state
|Ψ〉 = √p |+z〉 |+z〉+
√
1− p |−z〉 |−z〉
where p 6= 1/2, then (A 6⊥ S) and (B 6⊥ T ). Because it is intuitively clear that the choice of measurement does have
a causal influence on the outcome, the independences (A ⊥ S) and (B ⊥ T ) are pathological in the context of the
causal discovery algorithms. Given that if the EPR (CHSH) experiment is implemented with a state that is close to
maximally entangled, it still satisfies (violates) the Bell inequalities, we consider these states instead. (If one likes, p
may be taken to be arbitrarily close to 1/2.) We then get the following generating sets of independence relations,
EPR: (S ⊥ T ) , (A ⊥ T |S) , (B ⊥ S |T ) ,
CHSH: (S ⊥ T ) , (A ⊥ T |S) , (B ⊥ S |T ) ,
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where (S ⊥ T ) asserts the independence of the settings, and (A ⊥ T |S) and (B ⊥ S |T ) are the no-signalling condi-
tions (Eq. (8)).
The critical point is that the set of independences are the same for the EPR and the CHSH experiments. Since the
input to the causal discovery algorithms that we consider is limited to conditional independence relations, it follows
that whatever causal conclusions these algorithms draw, they will draw the same causal conclusions about the EPR
experiment as they do about the CHSH experiment. And yet, from the fact that the EPR correlations satisfy the
Bell inequalities, we know that they can be explained by local causes while from the fact that the CHSH correlations
violate a Bell inequality, we know that they cannot be so explained.
So the conclusion is that CI-based causal discovery algorithms do not do justice to Bell’s theorem. Independences
simply do not provide enough information. One needs a causal discovery algorithm that looks at the strength of
correlations to reproduce Bell’s conclusion.
Despite the inability of the standard causal discovery algorithms to distinguish correlations that violate the Bell
inequalities from those that satisfy them, it is nonetheless interesting to see what happens when one applies the
algorithms to the set of independences we found for the EPR and CHSH experiments. We will refer to these as
nontrivial no-signalling correlations (‘nontrivial’ in the sense that there is some nonvanishing correlation between the
outcomes for some choices of the settings).
In applying the causal discovery algorithms, we will assume for the moment that the setting variable on one wing
is a cause of the outcome variable on that wing, that is, we will assume that S is a cause of A and that T is a cause
of B. This assumption will be relaxed in Sec. V. In this case, the assumption that there are no causal cycles then
implies that there can be no causal influence from A to S, nor from B to T . Nonetheless, we are still permitting
influences from the outcome on one wing to the setting on the other, although, as we will see, the causal discovery
algorithms will rule against such influences.
A. No latent variables
It is instructive to consider the causal structure that arises for a single representative causal ordering of the variables.
We take S < T < A < B. Then, the most general causal structure is illustrated in Fig. 22. Hence the most general
joint distribution for this ordering is of the form
P (S, T,A,B) = P (S)P (T |S)P (A|S, T )P (B|S, T,A).
S T
BA
FIG. 22: The most general causal structure for the causal ordering S < T < A < B, assuming no hidden variables.
The independence (S ⊥ T ) implies that P (T |S) = P (T ), and the independence (A ⊥ T |S) implies that
P (A|S, T ) = P (A|S). The independence (B ⊥ S|T ) has no nontrivial implications for this causal ordering, hence
the term P (B|S, T,A) cannot be simplified. From these CI relation it follows that the joint distribution can be
written as
P (S, T,A,B) = P (S)P (T )P (A|S)P (B|S, T,A),
which corresponds to the causal structure in Fig. 23a. If we change the ordering of variables so that B precedes
A, then by a similar argument, we obtain the causal structure in Fig. 23b. For every other possible causal ordering
consistent with our assumption that S < A and T < B, we also obtain one of the causal structures of Fig. 23.
Consider the causal structure in Fig. 23a, Although it faithfully captures (S ⊥ T ) and (A ⊥ T |S) , it does not
faithfully capture (B ⊥ S|T ) . The only way to explain the independence (B ⊥ S|T ) within this causal model is
by fine-tuning of the causal parameters in the model, for instance, if the parameters defining P (B|S, T,A) are not
independent of those defining P (A|S). A similar problem arises for the causal structure in Fig. 23b. It follows that
in the case of no latent variables, no causal structure can satisfy faithfulness for the conditional independences of
nontrivial no-signalling correlations.
Note that if, instead of applying the Wermuth-Lauritzen algorithm to the nontrivial no-signalling correlations, one
applies the IC algorithm [1], equivalently the SGS algorithm [2] (which also assume no latent variables), one finds
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FIG. 23: Possible causal structures for no-signalling correlations, assuming no hidden variables, for causal orderings
S < T < A < B, T < S < A < B, S < A < T < B (23a) and S < T < B < A, T < S < B < A, T < B < S < A
(23b).
that it returns a graph that is not a valid pattern, signalling a failure of the algorithm. This is what one would expect
given that the algorithm only promises to return a valid causal structure if there exists one that satisfies faithfulness,
and in this case, there is not.
There is an interesting lesson here for the foundations of quantum theory. Long before Bell’s work, Einstein had
pointed out that if one did not assume hidden variables, then one could only explain the EPR correlations by positing
superluminal causes. This argument was made in his comments at the 1927 Solvay conference [19] (See Refs. [20]
and [7] for more concerning Einstein’s arguments on completeness and locality.) One can easily cast Einstein’s
argument into the mold of causal discovery algorithms as follows. If we allow the quantum state ψ, considered as a
classical variable, as the only common cause, then the assumption of no superluminal causal influences implies that
P (A,B|S, T, ψ) = P (A|S, ψ)P (B|T, ψ), and given that ψ is fixed in the experiment (it is a variable which only takes
one possible value), this implies that A and B should be uncorrelated, in contradiction with the EPR correlations.
But Einstein failed to explicitly note another mysterious feature of the EPR correlations, which our analysis
highlights: even if one is willing to countenance superluminal causal influences in an attempt to explain the EPR
correlations without recourse to hidden variables, ensuring that these superluminal causes cannot be used to send
superluminal signals implies that there must be fine-tuning in the underlying causal model.
B. Latent variables allowed
If one simply inputs the independences of nontrivial no-signalling correlations into the IC* algorithm of Ref. [1],
which allows latent variables, one obtains the pattern illustrated in Fig. 24 as output.
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FIG. 24: The output pattern of the IC* algorithm when applied to nontrivial no-signalling correlations.
Recall that the arrows with an empty circle at their tail imply that one can have either a direct causal link or a
common cause. If one believes that the settings at each wing are freely chosen, then one is inclined to think that
either the setting variables S and T should be direct causes of A and B respectively, or that if they are not, then it is
the common cause for A and S and the common cause for B and T that is freely chosen. In this case, we could lump
the common causes into the definition of the setting variables without loss of generality.
Besides this caveat about the causal relation between S and A and between T and B, the causal structures with
pairwise common causes that are consistent with the pattern that the IC* algorithm has returned are precisely those
that capture Bell’s notion of local causality, illustrated in Fig. 19. Moreover, the principle of minimality, applied to
the causal models consistent with the CI relations, would lead us to favour the causal model of Fig. 19. But because
such a causal model satisfies the Bell inequalities, while the CHSH correlations do not, we know that it cannot provide
a causal explanation of the CHSH correlations.
This is how the deficiency of the IC* algorithm manifests itself when applied to quantum correlations. The problem
is that a causal structure with latent variables that reproduces the CI relations of a given distribution might not be
capable of reproducing the distribution itself. In particular, the causal structure of Fig. 19 reproduces the CI relations
of the distribution P (A,B, S, T ) defined by the CHSH experiment, namely (S ⊥ T ) , (A ⊥ T |S) and (B ⊥ S |T ),
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but it cannot reproduce the distribution itself. As our brief discussion in Sec. III B highlighted, if one applies the
principle of minimality among the causal models that are consistent with the CI relations, rather than among the
causal models that are consistent with the entire observed distribution, one can mistakenly come to favour a causal
model that cannot reproduce the observed distribution.
Of course, we already pointed out in Sec. IV, that the input of the IC* algorithm cannot distinguish Bell-inequality-
violating from Bell-inequality-satisfying correlations. So we reiterate our conclusion from Sec. IV, that causal discovery
algorithms which look only at conditional independences are inadequate to the task of establishing whether or not
correlations can be explained by a locally causal model. We require better algorithms that also take into account the
strengths of the correlations.
C. Some proposed causal explanations of quantum correlations
We now apply the ideas behind causal discovery algorithms to a few of the existing proposals for providing a causal
explanation of Bell-inequality-violating correlations. We consider three: superluminal causation, superdeterminism,
and retrocausation.
We start by considering the most general kind of causal explanation here, where one allows hidden variables. Causal
structures without hidden variables are a special case of these. Nonetheless, we consider the case of no hidden variables
explicitly to ensure that there is no confusion.
1. Superluminal causation
One option for explaining Bell correlations causally is to assume that there are some superluminal causes, for
instance, a causal influence from the outcome on one wing to the outcome on the other, or from the setting on one
wing to the outcome on the other, or both. The possibilities are illustrated in Fig. 25.
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FIG. 25: Examples of causal structures that posit superluminal causal influences to explain Bell correlations.
These sorts of causal explanations of Bell-inequality violations, however, are unsatisfactory in light of the principles
embodied in causal discovery algorithms. Given the superluminal causal influences from one wing to the other, the
only way to explain the lack of superluminal signals, that is the CI relations of Eq. (8), is through a fine-tuning of
the causal parameters.
For instance, in Fig. 25c, the correlations set up between S and B along the direct causal path could cancel with
those set up by the causal path through A. (The path through λ cannot set up correlations between S and B because
there is a collider on A in this path and we are not conditioning on A.) Such a cancelation requires fine-tuning of the
parameters of the model.
To salvage no-signalling for the causal structure of Fig. 25a, we need a different sort of fine-tuning (a similar sort of
fine-tuning mechanism can also be used for the causal structure of Fig. 25b). For instance, it could be that λ = (λ1, λ2)
where λ1 is a binary variable that is uniformly distributed and that B is a function of S ⊕ λ1, T and λ2. In this case,
we can ensure that (B ⊥ S|T ) by virtue of the special distribution on λ1, which is a kind of fine-tuning.
Note that this is precisely the sort of causal structure that is assumed in the Toner and Bacon model [21], where
Bell-inequality violations are simulated by classical communication11. This model also involves fine-tuning insofar as
11This model works even when the measurement setting for each qubit is chosen arbitrarily, rather than being limited to the two settings of
the CHSH experiment.
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signalling is prohibited only for a special distribution over the shared random variables posited by the model.
The deBroglie-Bohm interpretation is a prominent example of a model that seeks to provide a causal explanation
of Bell correlations using superluminal causal influences. Consider the deBroglie-Bohm interpretation of a relativistic
theory such as the model of QED provided by Struyve and Westman [22], or else of a nonrelativistic theory wherein
the interaction Hamiltonians are such that there is a maximum speed at which signals can propagate. In both cases,
it is presumed that there is a preferred rest frame that is hidden at the operational level. In a Bell experiment, if
the measurement on the left wing occurs prior to the measurement on the right wing relative to the preferred rest
frame, then there is a superluminal causal influence from the setting on the left wing to the outcome on the right
wing, mediated by the quantum state, which is considered to be a part of the ontology of the theory [23]. (Note
that no causal influence from the outcome of the first experiment to the outcome of the second is required because
the outcomes are deterministic functions of the Bohmian configuration and the wavefunction.) It follows from our
analysis that the parameters in the causal model posited by the deBroglie-Bohm interpretation must be fine-tuned in
order to explain the lack of superluminal signalling.
Valentini’s version of the deBroglie-Bohm interpretation makes this fact particularly clear. In Refs. [24, 25] he has
noted that the wavefunction plays a dual role in the deBroglie-Bohm interpretation. On the one hand, it is part of the
ontology, a pilot wave that dictates the dynamics of the system’s configuration (the positions of the particles in the
nonrelativistic theory). On the other hand, the wavefunction has a statistical character, specifying the distribution
over the system’s configurations. In order to eliminate this dual role, Valentini suggests that the wavefunction is
only a pilot wave and that any distribution over the configurations should be allowed as the initial condition. It
is argued that one can still recover the standard distribution of configurations on a coarse-grained scale as a result
of dynamical evolution [26]. Within this approach, the no-signalling constraint is a feature of a special equilibrium
distribution. The tension between Bell inequality violations and no-signalling is resolved by abandoning the latter
as a fundamental feature of the world and asserting that it only holds as a contingent feature. The fine-tuning is
explained as the consequence of equilibration. (It has also been noted in the causal model literature that equilibration
phenomena might account for fine-tuning of causal parameters [27].)
Conversely, the version of the deBroglie-Bohm interpretation espoused by Du¨rr, Goldstein and Zhangi [28] – which
takes no-signalling to be a non-contingent feature of the theory – does not seek to provide a dynamical explanation of
the fine-tuning. Consequently, it seems fair to say that the fine-tuning required by the deBroglie-Bohm interpretation
is less objectionable in Valentini’s version of the theory. On the other hand, the cost of justifying the fine-tuning by a
dynamical process of equilibration is that, because true equilibrium is an idealization that is never achieved in finite
time, one would expect systems to have small deviations from equilibrium and such deviations could in principle be
exploited to send signals superluminally. Valentini endorses this consequence of his version of the deBroglie-Bohm
interpretation [29] and indeed has made proposals for where the strongest deviations from equilibrium might arise [30].
Therefore, anyone who thinks that the absence of superluminal signals is a necessary, rather than a contingent, feature
of quantum theory, will not be enthusiastic about Valentini’s approach.
Another recent article that considers the question of whether Bell-inequality violations can be explained by superlu-
minal causal influences is Bancal et al. [31]. They consider a physical model wherein causal influences can propagate at
a speed v that is faster than light, v > c, but still finite. They imagine that this model deviates from quantum theory
in some of its operational predictions. In particular, if the two wings of a Bell experiment are space-like separated
relative to the v lightcone structure, then it is presumed that the Bell inequalities are not violated (contrary to the
quantum predictions), whereas if they are time-like separated relative to v (but still space-like separated relative to
c), the Bell inequalities are violated, as they would be in quantum theory. They then show that the the superluminal
causes in their model can be leveraged to achieve superluminal signalling. In this sense, their model is analogous to
Valentini’s model, and implies that if one is unwilling to endorse a theory allowing such signals, one should not posit
finite superluminal causal influences. Note, however, that, unlike Valentini’s model, the Bancal et al. model still
requires fine-tuning in those cases wherein the superluminal causal influences cannot be used to send superluminal
signals, such as the original bipartite scenario. The fine-tuning criticism of explanations positing superluminal causes
applies whether those the superluminal causes propagate at a finite speed or not.
2. Superdeterminism
Another option for a causal explanation of quantum correlations is to posit that the settings are not free but are
causally influenced by other variables.
For instance, the hidden variable λ (which correlates the outcomes) might causally influence one or both of the
setting variables, as illustrated in Figs. 26a and 26b. Alternatively, one can posit the existence of a second hidden
variable µ that is a common cause for the setting on one wing and the outcome on the other wing, as illustrated in
Fig. 26c. More complicated possibilities would have µ as a common cause of a subset of three of the settings and
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outcomes. Note that the possibility of a latent variable that is a common cause of λ and one or both settings has not
been excluded; it is incorporated into the first case. This is because any such variable could just be absorbed into the
definition of λ without loss of generality. The scenario in Fig. 26c could also be considered a special case of the one
in Fig. 26a, if we include µ into the definition of λ. Nonetheless, it is useful to separate out this second case because
it posits that the common cause of A and B is not correlated with the common cause of S and B.
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FIG. 26: Some causal structures that exploit the superdeterminism loophole to explain Bell correlations.
All of the causal influences posited in such models can be taken to be subluminal. However, such explanations of
the Bell correlations are clearly in conflict with the notion that the settings can be freely chosen by the experimenter.
To assert one of these causal structures as a way to resolve the mystery of Bell’s theorem is an instance of what
is commonly known as the “superdeterminism” loophole. But, just as with positing superluminal causal influences,
these causal structures are not faithful to the observed correlations because one or more of the observed CI relations –
S ⊥ T (independence of settings), (A ⊥ T |S) (no-signalling from left to right) and (B ⊥ S|T ) (no signalling from right
to left) – can only be satisfied by fine-tuning of the parameters in the causal model. This is a novel sort of objection
against the notion of a superdeterministic explanation of Bell-inequality-violations, independent of an appeal to free
will.
It is worth devoting a few words to the sort of fine-tuning that is required. First note that in the context of
abandoning the assumption of free will, the no-signalling constraint must be reinterpreted as an observed statistical
independence, rather than a statement about the consequences of an intervention on a setting variable. Of course,
this statistical independence is still observed and therefore must still be reproduced by the causal model. In the causal
structure of Fig. 26a, if we define λ∗ to be that part of λ that is correlated nontrivially with S, then we require that
λ∗ ⊥ B despite the arrow from λ to B. We can still do justice to the Bell correlations by having λ∗ correlated with
only the parity of A and B, while remaining uncorrelated with B. This is an instance of fine-tuning.
Similar fine-tuning tricks can be used to ensure that (B ⊥ S|T ) in the causal structures of Figs. 26b and 26c.
3. Retrocausation
“Retrocausation” refers to the possibility of causal influences that act in a direction contrary to the standard arrow
of time. It has been proposed as a means of resolving the mystery of Bell-inequality violations [32–36] by purportedly
saving the relativistic structure of the theory: rather than having causal influences propagating outside the light cone,
they propagate within the light cone although possibly within the backward light cone.
It is useful to distinguish two approaches to retrocausal explanations of Bell correlations: those that add cycles to
the causal structure and those that do not. Given that the former take us outside the framework of directed acyclic
graphs, we will confine our attention to acyclic retrocausation.
Price has described the idea of a retrocausal model of Bell inequality violations in Ref. [37]. It is not completely
clear whether he has in mind a model that posits cycles or not. However, he does argue that one way to generate a
retrocausal model is to start with a superdeterministic model and to simply reverse the causal arrows that lead into
the settings. For the examples of superdeterminism we have considered, such reversals lead to acyclic retrocausal
models. For instance, if one starts with the superdeterministic causal structure of Fig. 26a and reverses the λ → S
arrow, one obtains the causal structure of Fig. 27a, where setting S is a cause of the hidden variable λ. If one assumes
that S is chosen freely at a time to the future of when λ is set, then this model is clearly retrocausal.
Alternatively, consider taking the superdeterministic model of Fig. 26c and reversing the µ → S arrow, to obtain
the causal structure of Fig. 27c. If µ were presumed to be space-like separated from both S and B, it would simply
mediate a superluminal causal influence from S to B. However, if one posits that µ is in the common future of S and
B, then we can imagine that there is a causal influence from S to µ that is subluminal, and one from µ to B that is
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FIG. 27: Causal structures that exploit the retrocausation loophole to explain Bell correlations.
retrocausal. Alternatively, if one posits that µ is in the common past of S and B, then the causal influence from S to
µ must be assumed to be retrocausal.
Note that if one views spatio-temporal relations as supervening upon causal relations, rather than vice-versa,
then there is no freedom to specify the spatio-temporal location of µ and the distinction drawn above is not mean-
ingful. Even if one takes spatio-temporal notions to be primary, the fact that the location of µ seems to be mere
window-dressing in the context of a causal explanation of Bell-inequality violations undermines the distinction between
retrocausation and superluminal causation.
Fine-tuning is just as necessary within the retrocausal explanations as it was in the ones that posited superluminal
influences or superdeterminism. Without it, one would obtain a correlation between S and B, in contradiction with
their observed statistical independence. Indeed, if these causal structures could be supplemented with arbitrary causal
parameters, then one could use the causal chain of influence that extends from S to B to send a signal.
4. Causal explanations without hidden variables
Note that causal structures without hidden variables can always be interpreted as causal structures with trivial
hidden variables. If λ is a variable acting as a common cause of other variables but takes only a single value, then
it cannot generate a statistical correlation among its causal children. Equivalently, a variable acts as a nontrivial
common cause only if the distribution over its values has a nontrivial spread.
Recall Fig. 25, which considers both a common cause relation holding between A and B together with a superluminal
causal influence from the settings and/or outcomes on one wing to the outcome on the other wing. If the hidden
variable λ is trivial, then we can drop it from the causal structure, to obtain the following DAGs, wherein A and B
are related only by a superluminal causal influence from the settings and/or outcomes on one wing to the outcome
on the other wing.
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FIG. 28: Examples of causal structures that posit superluminal causal influences but no hidden variables to explain
Bell correlations.
The first two of these causal diagrams, 28a and 28b, are not viable as causal explanations of the observed correlations
because they each imply a CI relation that is not observed: 28a implies (A ⊥ B|S), while 28b implies (S ⊥ B|A). So
only 28c is a candidate for a causal explanation. However, it is obvious that this causal structure requires fine-tuning
to explain the no-signalling independence B ⊥ S just as much as the causal structures of Fig. 25 do.
The fact that trivial variables as common causes are useless for explaining correlations serves to clarify how Bell’s
theorem provides a challenge to the possibility of causal explanations of quantum correlations even if one espouses
the interpretation of quantum theory wherein the pure quantum state ψ is a complete description of reality (this is
called a ψ-complete ontological model in the terminology of Ref. [7]). Believing that Bell’s theorem only holds if one
assumes hidden variables is a common error. We therefore pause to consider what is wrong with an intuition which
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may well acount for the error, namely, that in a Bell experiment the common cause of the measurement outcomes is
the quantum state of the pair of particles.
Within the framework of causal models, only a variable can act as a common cause. If one takes the quantum
state of the pair of particles to be a common cause within this framework, then it is a trivial variable: it is fixed
in the experiment to some particular state ψ, which is known to the experimentalist. Consequently, the quantum
correlations are of the form
P (A,B|S, T ) = P (A|S, ψ)P (B|T, ψ),
which is a product distribution. Alternatively, if one considers a variable Ψ that varies over all possible quantum
states for the pair of particles, then in the experiment the distribution over this variable is a Dirac-delta distribution
centered on ψ, P (Ψ) = δ(Ψ− ψ), and it again follows that
P (A,B|S, T ) =
∫
dΨP (A|S,Ψ)P (B|T,Ψ)P (Ψ) = P (A|S, ψ)P (B|T, ψ).
Therefore, any causal model wherein the quantum state is considered to be a common cause does not yield any
correlation between the measurement outcomes, let alone correlations that violate a Bell inequality. Indeed, if one
does not allow hidden variables, then the only way to explain correlations between A and B, even those that satisfy
the Bell inequalities, is through a causal influence from the settings and/or outcomes on one wing to the outcome on
the other wing, as in Fig. 28. But to make this influence consistent with the no-signalling independence relations, one
requires fine-tuning. Because the possiblity of an explanation in terms of a hidden common cause, distinct from the
quantum state, has been ruled out from the outset by the assumption of no hidden variables, Bell’s argument is not
required in this case. This is precisely what we concluded in our discussion of EPR correlations in Sec. IV A.
V. PROOF OF THE NECESSITY OF FINE-TUNING IN CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS OF BELL
INEQUALITY VIOLATIONS
Up until this point, we have followed closely the methodology of existing CI-based causal discovery algorithms. Such
algorithms aim to contend with scenarios wherein the number of observed variables may be large. Our interest here,
however, is Bell-type experiments, where there are only four observed variables. It follows that we can ignore the details
of existing algorithms and instead use a brute-force search to determine whether there is any causal explanation of
the correlations observed in such experiments that can do justice to the core principles of causal discovery algorithms.
We find that no such causal explanation is possible. This can be understood as a novel characterization of Bell’s
theorem.
We begin by clarifying the assumptions of our no-go theorem.
QCORR: The assumption that the following predictions of quantum theory are correct. In a Bell-type
experiment where the settings and outcomes are binary variables, with S (T ) and A (B) denoting, respec-
tively, the setting and outcome on the left (right) wing, it is possible to find a probability distribution
P (A,B, S, T ) such that: (i) the conditional independence relations (S ⊥ T ), asserting the marginal inde-
pendence of the settings, as well as (A ⊥ T |S) and (B ⊥ S |T ), asserting the conditional independence of
each local outcome from the distant setting given the local setting (which is the standard way of formalizing
the assumption of no superluminal signals) are satisfied, and (ii) a Bell inequality is violated.
CAUSAL: The assumption that a probability distribution over observed variables can be explained causally
using the standard framework of causal models, described in Sec. II. This framework presumes Reichen-
bach’s principle, which asserts that any correlation between a pair of variables must be explained either
by a causal influence from one variable to the other, or a common cause acting on both, or a combination
of the two mechanisms.
NOFINE: The assumption that the conditional independence relations that hold in a probability distribu-
tion over observed variables are a consequence of the causal structure alone rather than a consequence of
a particular choice of values for the causal-statistical parameters. This is the principle of faithfulness or
no fine-tuning described in Sec. III.
Our no-go theorem establishes that under the assumption of the framework of causal models, every causal model that
can reproduce no-signalling Bell-inequality-violating correlations must be fine-tuned. Formally, it can be characterized
as the inconsistency of our three assumptions above:
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Theorem 2 CAUSAL + NOFINE + QCORR ⇒ contradiction
Proof. We must consider all candidates for a causal model underlying the correlations among the observed variables
A, B, S and T.
Recall that there is no point adding latent variables that are transits between observed variables or the common
effect of observed variables, because these yield the same possibilities for correlations among the observed variables
as causal models that exclude such variables. So we need only consider adding latent variables that act as common
causes of observed variables.
From the CI relations, (S ⊥ T ), (A ⊥ T |S) and (B ⊥ S |T ), one can deduce the CI relations (S ⊥ B) and (T ⊥ A)
using the semi-graphoid axioms. For instance, from (S ⊥ T ) and (B ⊥ S |T ), the contraction axiom allows one to
infer (S ⊥ BT ), and then from the decomposition axiom, one obtains (S ⊥ B).
Consider which pairs of the observed variables could possibly admit of a hidden common cause. We can immediately
exclude hidden common causes for the pairs {S, T}, {S,B} and {T,A} because if there were such hidden common
causes then the only way to obtain the observed independences (S ⊥ T ) , (S ⊥ B) and (T ⊥ A) would be by fine-
tuning. This in turn implies that there cannot be a hidden common cause for all four of the observed variables,
because it would imply a hidden common cause for these pairs. Furthermore, because any triple of the observed
variables necessarily includes at least one of these pairs, there cannot be a hidden common cause for any triple either.
It follows therefore that the only sets of observed variables for which we need to consider the possibility of a hidden
common cause are the pairs {A,B} , {S,A} and {T,B}.
Now consider which pairs of the observed variables could possibly be connected by a direct causal influence. We
can exclude such influences for the pairs {S, T}, {S,B} and {T,A}, because if any such influence were present, we
could only ensure (S ⊥ T ) , (S ⊥ B) and (T ⊥ A) by fine-tuning. The only pairs for which there can be a direct
causal influence, therefore, are {A,B} , {S,A} and {T,B} .
Finally, consider which pairs of the observed variables could possibly have no causal connection between the elements
of the pair. From the fact that the pairs {S, T}, {S,B} and {T,A} admit neither a hidden common cause nor a direct
causal influence, they are necessarily in the set of pairs for which there is no causal connection. Conversely, we can
exclude the possibility of no causal connection for the pairs {A,B} , {S,A} and {T,B}, because there would then be
no way of explaining the observed correlations between S and A or between T and B or between A and B given S
and T.
So, nontrivial causal connections can arise only for the pairs {A,B} , {S,A} and {T,B}, and in each case there
can be a direct causal influence in either direction, a hidden common cause, or a hidden common cause acting jointly
with a direct causal influence in one direction; these are just the five possibilities outlined in Fig. 14.
We now exclude all the possibilities wherein there is a direct causal influence from A to B. We do this by noting
that whichever of the five causal connections hold between S and A, for generic parameters, S and B would be
correlated (i.e. S and B would not be d-separated in the DAG), so that the only way to ensure (S ⊥ B) would be by
fine-tuning. By symmetry of the independence relations under the exchange A↔ B and S ↔ T , one can also exclude
all the possibilities wherein there is a direct causal influence from B to A. It follows that A and B must be related
by a hidden common cause alone.
We now consider the possibility of a causal influence from A to S. This would be an odd sort of influence, from
the outcome to the setting, but we don’t need to appeal to its oddness to rule it out; it can be excluded based on the
principle of fine-tuning. The argument is as follows. If such a causal influence existed, then because of the common
cause acting on A and B (the existence of which we demonstrated above), we would find that B and S ought to be
correlated for generic choices of the parameters (i.e. B and S would not be d-separated in the DAG), so that the only
way to ensure (S ⊥ B) would be fine-tuning. By symmetry, we can also exclude the possibility of a causal influence
from B to T .
It follows that the only causal structures that can explain the observed CI relations without fine-tuning have the
following features: A and B have a common cause; S and A are related by a direct causal influence from S to A, or
by a common cause, or by both mechanisms; T and B are related by a direct causal influence from T to B, or by a
common cause, or by both mechanisms.
We now demonstrate that regardless of which of the three possible causal mechanisms (depicted in Fig. 13) are
acting between S and A, and also regardless of which of the three are acting between T and B, we can express the
conditional probability P (A,B|S, T ) as follows (where λ denotes the hidden variable which is the common cause of A
and B)
P (A,B|S, T ) =
∑
λ
P (A|S, λ)P (B|T, λ)P (λ). (10)
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We argue this as follows. Begin by noting that by the definition of conditional probability, we have
P (A,B, S, T ) =
∑
λ
P (A,S|B, T, λ)P (B, T |λ)P (λ). (11)
However, for all nine of the causal diagrams that remain, we have (AS ⊥ BT |λ), and therefore P (A,S|B, T, λ) =
P (A,S|λ), so that
P (A,B, S, T ) =
∑
λ
P (A,S|λ)P (B, T |λ)P (λ). (12)
From this expression, we determine P (A,B|S, T ) using the definition of conditional probability, P (A,B|S, T ) =
P (A,B, S, T )/P (S, T ). By assumption, (S ⊥ T ), so P (S, T ) = P (S)P (T ) and it follows that
P (A,B|S, T ) =
∑
λ
P (A,S|λ)
P (S)
P (B, T |λ)
P (T )
P (λ). (13)
Next, we show that regardless of which of the three causal relations hold between S and A, we have
P (A,S|λ)
P (S)
= P (A|S, λ). (14)
By symmetry, this implies that regardless of which of the three causal relations hold between T and B, we have
P (B, T |λ)
P (T )
= P (B|T, λ). (15)
Eqs. (13), (14) and (15) together imply Eq. (10).
So it remains only to prove that Eq. (14) holds for each of the three possible causal relations between S and A.
In each case, one can easily verify that (S ⊥ λ). This follows, for instance, from an application of the d-separation
criterion (described in Appendix A) for each of the three possible causal relations. Recalling that this fact may be
expressed as P (S|λ) = P (S) and given that by definition P (A|S, λ) = P (A,S|λ)/P (S|λ), one sees that Eq. (14)
follows.
So we conclude that the only causal structures that can explain the observed CI relations without fine-tuning are
such that P (A,B|S, T ) can be decomposed as in Eq. (10). However, it is well known that the existence of such a
decomposition implies that P (A,B|S, T ) satisfies the Bell inequalities. This contradicts our assumption that a Bell
inequality is violated, so these causal structures are also excluded as candidate explanations of the correlations. We
have thereby exhausted the set of possible causal structures.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Our two main conclusions are as follows. First, causal discovery algorithms that appeal only to conditional indepen-
dences among observed variables cannot distinguish between Bell-inequality-violating and Bell-inequality-satisfying
correlations. Better algorithms which look to the strength of correlations are needed to do justice to Bell’s theorem.
Second, and more importantly, we have shown that any causal model which can reproduce Bell-inequality violations
while respecting the observed independences—the marginal independence of the measurement settings and the no-
signalling condition—will necessarily violate a principle that is at the core of all the best causal discovery algorithms,
namely, that observed independences should not be explained by fine-tuning of the causal parameters in the model.
This is true in particular for all explanatory strategies that fit within the framework of directed acyclic graphs sup-
plemented with conditional probabilities, including models that posit superluminal causes, models that exploit the
superdeterminism loophole, and models that posit retrocausation.
The topic of causal discovery is still relatively young. The best algorithms available today are not likely to be the
final story. Indeed, our analysis suggests that the tools that have been developed in the literature on the foundations of
quantum theory for assessing the possibility of local explanations of correlations may well be important for developing
causal discovery algorithms. If one could deliver on this promise, then it would be an interesting example of the field
of quantum foundations having applications in other fields, such as statistics and machine learning, and via these, in
medicine, genetics, economics and other disciplines wherein causal discovery plays a prominent role.
Conversely, it is our view that there is a great deal more insight to be gained about the foundations of quantum
theory from the literature on causal models and causal discovery algorithms. We consider a few possible directions of
research along these lines.
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As mentioned previously, defining causality in a manner that does not make reference to temporal ordering provides
a language by which one could hope to describe a fundamental theory wherein spatio-temporal notions are emergent
and notions of causal structure are primitive. In such a theory, it would not be the case that a cause was defined to
be prior in time to its effects, but rather the notion of the temporal order of two events would be defined in terms
of whether one event was a potential cause of the other. Consequently, the framework for causal inference provides a
natural arena in which to pursue the idea that space-time is emergent, a notion that is popular in attempts to unify
general relativity with quantum theory [38, 39].
There are a number of results in the quantum foundations literature that have the following form: make some
assumptions about the causal structure and derive inequalities on the correlations that can be obtained from these
classically. Svetlichny’s inequalities are an example of this [40], wherein one considers a triple of measurements at
space-like separation and one allows a mixture of causal structures wherein superluminal influences can propagate
between any two of the wings of the experiment. The topic has been studied in Refs. [41–43]. Fritz has also recently
derived inequalities on classical correlations for some causal structures that do not correspond to the standard Bell
scenario [13]. Such results are examples of a general approach to correlations that has been developed in the causal
model literature. For instance, In Pearl’s book (Sec. 8.4), inequalities on correlations are derived from assumptions
about the causal structure in a section considering noncompliance in drug trials. Pearl points out the similarity
between these “instrumental” inequalities and the Bell inequalities, and adds: “The instrumental inequality can, in
a sense, be viewed as a generalization of Bell’s inequality for cases where direct causal connection is permitted to
operate between the correlated observables, X and Y.” It will be interesting to see how many results in the quantum
foundations literature can be considered to be instances of such generalized inequalities.
Finally, by exploiting a quantum analogue of conditional probability proposed by Leifer [44] and developed by Leifer
and Spekkens [45, 46] and an associated quantum analogue of conditional independence (see Leifer and Poulin [47],
for instance), one can hope to explore a generalization of the notion of causal model to a quantum causal model. A
quantum causal model is naturally defined as a quantum causal structure, which is a directed acyclic graph wherein
each node is a quantum system, and a set of quantum causal parameters, which constitute a set of conditional quantum
states (the quantum analogue of conditional probability) for every node given its causal parents. Insofar as one can
accommodate classical variables as special cases of quantum systems (corresponding to commuting algebras), one can
describe correlations among settings and outcomes within quantum causal models.
Quantum causal models make similar assumptions about the possibilities for causal structure as do classical causal
models (no cycles for instance), and they make similar assumptions about the consequences of causal structure for
statistical independences, but they replace the formalism of classical probability theory with a noncommutative gen-
eralization thereof. If one can make the case that the formalism of quantum causal models is not just a mathematical
artifice but can be given a sensible interpretation as a form of causal explanation, then such models can provide a
causal explanation of Bell-inequality violations without requiring fine-tuning.
Note, however, that if the conditional probabilities that appear in classical causal models are interpreted as degrees
of belief – and we take this to be the most sensible interpretation – then the transition from classical causal models
to quantum causal models involves not only a modification to physics, but a modification to the rules of inference.
In this view, the correct theory of inference is not a priori but empirical. Nonetheless, one cannot simply declare by
fiat that some formulation of quantum theory is a theory of inference. One must justify this claim. At a minimum,
one must determine how standard concepts in a theory of inference generalize to the quantum domain. One could
also reconsider the various proposals for axiomatic derivations of classical probability theory, for instance, that of
Cox [48] or that of de Finetti [49], to see whether a reasonable modification of the axioms yields a quantum theory of
inference12. Ideally, one would show that if quantum causal models imply a modification to both our physics and to
our theory of inference, then these modifications are not independent. After all, the physics determines the precise
manner in which an agent can gather information about the world and in turn act upon it and so the physics should
determine what is the most adaptive theory of inference for an agent. It is in this sense that the project of defining
quantum causal models is not yet complete and only with such a completion in hand can one really say that a causal
explanation of the Bell correlations without recourse to fine-tuning has been achieved.
12Fuchs and Schack have also suggested that parts of quantum theory can be derived by an appeal to dutch-book coherence following de
Finetti [50].
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Appendix A: d-separation
Conditional independence relations are captured in directed acyclic graphs by the notion of distance-separation or
d-separation. First let us introduce the basic elements of which a DAG may be composed; these are colliders, forks,
and chains; which for three variables A,B,C are illustrated in Fig. 29.
A C B
(a) Collider
A C B
(b) Fork.
A C B
A C B
(c) Chain
FIG. 29: Basic structures found in DAGs.
Given a DAG G. A path between two vertices X and Y in G is any set of edges and vertices which connects X
and Y , regardless of the direction of the edges. We say that a path between X and Y is blocked by a set of vertices
Z if at least one of the following conditions holds
1. The path contains a chain (Fig, 29c), or a fork (Fig. 29b) such that C is in Z.
2. The path contains a collider (Fig. 29a) such that C is not in Z and no descendant of C is in Z.
We then have the following definition of d-separation:
Definition 3 (d-separation) Given a DAG G with vertices V, two vertices X,Y ∈ V are d-separated by a set of
vertices Z ⊂ V if and only if Z blocks all paths between X and Y .
d-separation is a relation among three sets of variables in a DAG. If one is interpreting DAGs as causal networks
(as in this article), then d-separation must represent a causal relation among the three sets of variables. By contrast,
conditional independence represents a statistical relation among them. One might say that X is causally screened off
from Y given Z whenever X is d-separated from Y given Z. Of course, the significance of this causal relation is found
in the statistical distributions that can be supported by the causal structure. A set of variables X is d-separated from
the set Y given the set Z in a causal structure if and only if for all probability distributions over the causal structure,
X is conditionally independent of Y given Z.
